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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 890529-CA 
v. : 
GREGORY DOUGLAS THOMAS, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for theft, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 or 76-6-
410 (1978). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989) because the appeal is 
from a district court in a criminal case involving a third degree 
felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance to defendant. 
2. Whether the jury was erroneously instructed 
regarding the value of the items taken. 
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the 
jury's verdict regarding the value of the items taken. 
4. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct in 
statements made in closing argument. 
5. Whether the trial court erred in denying 
defendant's motion for new trial. 
6. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove 
defendant took the items with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged on March 1, 1989, in the 
alternative with theft by deception or theft pursuant to a rental 
agreement, either one a third degree felony (Record [hereinafter 
R.] at 1-2). The public defenders association entered an 
appearance, and preliminary hearing was waived on April 6, 1989 
(R. at 8). Thereafter, defendant was represented by Robert L. 
Froerer at arraignment, pretrial, and trial (R. at 11, 19, and 
21). 
Defendant was tried by jury on May 25, 1989, in the 
Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, the 
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, district judge, presiding (R. at 21-
23 and Transcript of trial [hereinafter Tr.]. The first page of 
the minute entry [R. at 21] lists the date of trial as May 22; 
however, the transcript and the subsequent pages of the minute 
entry all give May 25 as the trial date). Defendant was found 
guilty as charged (R. at 23 and 27). After a presentence 
investigation by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, 
defendant was sentenced on June 19, 1989, to a term in the Utah 
State Prison not to exceed five years (R. at 23 and 60). That 
sentence was stayed and defendant placed on probation with the 
conditions that he serve sixty days in the Weber County Jail with 
work release, pay a fine of $240,00 with a surcharge of $60.00, 
pay restitution of $320.00 or restore satisfactory pallets, and 
submit to mental health evaluation and counseling (R. at 60-61). 
On June 26, 1989, defendant's new counsel, David J. 
Berceau, filed an application for certificate of probable cause 
and a motion for stay of execution of sentence; the court granted 
the motion for stay of execution of sentence (R. at 65, 78, 63, 
and 79). Defendant also filed a motion for new trial or, in the 
alternative, acquittal notwithstanding the verdict (R. at 73-74). 
Accompanying the motion for new trial were purported estimates of 
the cost of wooden pallets (R. at 70 and unnumbered between 80 
and 81). The court conducted a hearing on the motions and, on 
August 14, 1989, denied the motion for new trial and granted the 
certificate of probable cause (R. at 81-85). On September 8, 
1989, defendant's notice of appeal, dated August 7, 1989, was 
filed (R. at 86). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 10, 1989, defendant, a self-proclaimed 
dealer in wooden pallets, appeared at Knox McDaniel Company in 
Weber County (Tr. at 19 and 56-57). Knox McDaniel Company 
produces animal vitamin and mineral premixes (Tr. at 18). When 
Knox McDaniel purchases material, that material is delivered on 
wooden pallets and Knox McDaniel is charged $8.00 per pallet (Tr. 
at 19 and 34, and trial Exhibit No. 2 which is attached to this 
brief as Addendum B). Knox McDaniel's policy was to then charge 
its own customers $8.00 per pallet when the company sent their 
product out on the pallets (Tr. at 26-32, 34-35, and trial 
Exhibit No. 2, Addendum B). If the pallets were returned to Knox 
McDaniel in good condition, the customer received a credit of 
$8.00 (Tr. at 28). 
When defendant turned up at Knox McDaniel on January 
10th, he spoke with the plant manager, John Erickson (Tr. at 18-
19). Defendant asked Mr. Erickson if he could borrow about a 
hundred pallets from the company to use in moving rock. 
Defendant said that he was short of pallets. Mr. Erickson 
checked the stock of pallets and told defendant he could only 
lend him forty pallets. Defendant did not tell Mr. Erickson that 
he worked for a pallet company. Defendant was very particular 
about the kind of pallet he wanted; the company had broken 
pallets there, but defendant did not want those (Tr. at 20). Mr. 
Erickson helped load the forty pallets on defendant's truck and 
told defendant to return them within one week (Tr. at 21). 
Defendant and Mr. Erickson agreed that defendant would pay a 
$50.00 deposit to ensure the return of the pallets (Tr. at 22). 
Mr. Erickson contacted a secretary in the front office, 
told her the terms of the agreement for defendant to borrow the 
pallets, and asked her to draw up a written agreement for 
defendant's signature (Tr. at 21-22). He also told her to get 
defendant's license plate number and his phone number. Mr. 
Erickson also wrote down the license plate number of defendant's 
truck (Tr. at 22). 
Sheryl K. Cheever was the secretary who took the 
information from Mr. Erickson and wrote the agreement which 
defendant signed (Tr. at 35-36). She testified that Mr. Erickson 
told her that defendant was borrowing 40 pallets to be returned 
within one week and was going to leave a $50.00 deposit. She was 
to get defendant's license plate number and phone number and to 
have him sign the paper (Tr. at 36). She wrote out the 
agreement, which included the agreed-upon return date, and which 
was introduced into evidence as Exhibit No. 1 (Tr. at 37-38, and 
attached as Addendum A). When defendant approached Ms. Cheever, 
he told her he only had $30.00, and she asked the Knox McDaniel 
purchasing agent if that was all right. When he told her it was, 
she wrote $30.00 on the agreement and accepted that amount as a 
deposit (Tr. at 37). Ms. Cheever asked for defendant's license 
plate and phone numbers and wrote them down as he gave them to 
her (Tr. at 37-38). She handed the document to defendant and 
watched him sign it (Tr. at 38). 
When defendant had not returned the pallets a month 
after he took them, Mr. Erickson began to search for him (Tr. at 
24). He first looked at the agreement which Ms. Cheever had 
drawn up and noticed that the deposit amount was less than that 
agreed upon and that the license number written on the agreement 
was different from the license number which he had written down 
(Tr. at 23). Mr. Erickson then called the telephone number 
defendant had given Ms. Cheever and found that the number did not 
belong to defendant (Tr. at 24). Mr. Erickson then contacted the 
police (Tr. at 25). 
Detective John Stubbs of the Ogden Police Department 
was assigned to the case (Tr. at 40-41). He investigated the 
license plate number written on the agreement and found that it 
was a nonexistent registration in Utah. He next investigated the 
license number written down by Mr. Erickson and found that it was 
registered to "a Greg Thomas at 1498 South 400 East in Salt Lake 
City" (Tr. at 42). A "skip trace" turned up information leading 
to a new address for defendant and that defendant worked for the 
Rocky Mountain Pallet Company in Salt Lake City. Investigation 
showed that Rocky Mountain Pallet Company no longer existed (Tr. 
at 43). Detective Stubbs went to the most current address he had 
obtained and spotted defendant's flatbed truck on 45th South in 
Salt Lake City (Tr. at 44). 
Detective Stubbs stopped the truck and found defendant 
was driving it (Tr. at 44). He told defendant why he had stopped 
him and gave defendant the Miranda warnings (Tr. at 45). 
Detective Stubbs asked defendant about the pallets, and defendant 
admitted to having taken them but said he simply had not gotten 
around to returning them. Detective Stubbs asked defendant about 
the erroneous license and phone numbers, and defendant answered, 
"Well, if you look[,] that isn't my handwriting." (Tr. at 46). 
When the detective told defendant that defendant had provided the 
information, defendant "skirted that issue completely and drove 
off in a different direction of conversation" (Tr. at 46). By 
that, the detective meant that defendant did not answer that 
question at all. Detective Stubbs then placed defendant under 
arrest (Tr. at 46). 
Detective Stubbs, along with another detective, then 
transported defendant to Ogden for booking in the Weber County 
Jail (Tr. at 47 and 49). During that drive, defendant steered 
the conversation back to the case, asking how he could "make [it] 
right, how he could get the charges dropped" (Tr. at 47-48). 
Detective Stubbs told defendant that he could not drop the 
charges but that telling the truth would impact what eventually 
happened in the case (Tr. at 48, 50-51 and 54). Defendant then 
said that he would tell what happened (Tr. at 48). Detective 
Stubbs testified: 
What he [defendant] told me was that he 
had already had one deal go sour on him on 
the day that he obtained these pallets up 
here in Ogden, and he did not want to drive 
back to Salt Lake light loaded and with only 
$30, and so he had done this deal with Knox 
McDaniel. Said that he had never done it 
before. 
He admitted to giving that information 
with respect to the telephone number; he 
admitted to giving bad information with 
respect to his license number. He said that 
he immediately drove the pallets down to Salt 
Lake to APCO Pallet Company where he had sold 
the pallets for $160. 
He said he just did not think that anyone 
would make such a big deal out of pallets. 
(Tr. at 48). 
After the State rested, defendant testified that he was 
in the business of buying, repairing and selling pallets and had 
been for four years (Tr. at 56). He claimed that he had 
purchased 13,000 pallets from the Farmer Jack stores when they 
went out of business and still had access to 4000 of those 
pallets (Tr. at 58). On cross examination, he testified that he 
still had 2000 or 3000 left of those pallets, but then said he 
really did not have access to them (Tr. at 78). Then he 
testified that he did not have thousands of pallets or he would 
not have gone to Knox McDaniel for pallets. Again, he testified 
that he did have access to pallets (Tr. at 80). 
On direct, defendant testified that he went to Knox 
McDaniel on January 10th looking for broken pallets and that was 
what he asked for. He said that he already had pallets on his 
truck and needed forty more (Tr. at 58). He said that Knox 
McDaniel only had ten broken ones and Mr. Erickson just told him 
to take forty pallets and leave a $50.00 deposit. Defendant said 
that he told Mr. Erickson that he only had $30.00 and Erickson 
agreed to that (Tr. at 59). Defendant claimed that he told Ms. 
Cheever that his license number was 6436BE and she wrote 6436VE. 
He also claimed that he gave her his phone number as 272-3052 and 
she wrote 272-3051. He blamed Ms. Cheever for writing down the 
wrong numbers and causing the "whole problem" (Tr.. at 60). 
Defendant claimed that he did not know that he was to return the 
pallets within one week; he testified that the company was going 
to call him when they needed the pallets back or that he had been 
told to return them in a couple of weeks (Tr. at 61). He said 
the pallets just slipped his mind and he forgot to return them 
(Tr. at 62) . 
Defendant testified that the pallets he took from Knox 
McDaniel were not worth a great deal. At one point he said that 
half of the Knox McDaniel pallets were softwood and less valuable 
(Tr. at 65). Next he testified that three quarters of the 
pallets were softwood (Tr. at 66). He testified that the Knox 
McDaniel pallets were only worth $2.50 each because "they were an 
average pallet" (Tr. at 66). Defendant explained his statement 
to the detectives as merely a ploy to try to get the officers to 
tell him what was happening (Tr. at 69). Defendant said that he 
told the officers he just forgot about returning the pallets and 
that answer "wasn't good enough," so he told the detectives that 
he took the pallets to APCO and sold them for $4.00 each (Tr. at 
68). He testified that that statement was not true, that he had 
not sold them to APCO, and that APCO would not have paid that 
much for the pallets (Tr. at 68-69). 
On direct examination, defendant testified that he had 
a wife and an eight month old child (Tr. at 68). On cross 
examination, he testified that the marriage was common law, but 
admitted that, when he was released from the Weber County Jail, 
he told the releasing officer that he was single (Tr. at 71-72). 
Defendant testified that he had never been to Knox McDaniel 
before January 10th, but then, in answer to the next question, 
said that he might have been there before (Tr. at 73). On 
direct, defendant testified that he had signed the agreement 
without looking at it; on cross, he stated that he had glanced at 
it (Tr. at 60 and 75). 
Finally, defendant called Jamie Puckett, director of 
operations for APCO Pallets, as a witness on the value of the 
pallets (Tr. at 83-84). He testified that pallets sold for 
"[a]bout $5.50" for number one, hardwood pallets, "[a]bout $4.50" 
for rebuilt hardwood, and "about $3.95" for softwood pallets (Tr. 
at 85-86). Then he testified that he bought the different kinds 
of pallets for $3.00, $1.50-$2.00, and $1.00 (Tr. at 86). Mr. 
Puckett testified that defendant came to him saying that he was 
in "some sort of trouble" and asking for a price quotation for 
pallets (Tr. at 87). Mr. Puckett prepared Exhibit No. 3 in 
response to that request (Tr. at 87, and Addendum C). 
On cross examination, Mr. Puckett testified that he 
would not know the value of a pallet set by a wholesaler shipping 
on a pallet to a retailer. He admitted that he did not know the 
value a retailer would assess to the pallet when turning around 
and sending a product out again on the pallet (Tr. at 89). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that there were numerous errors at 
trial which raised the specter of ineffective assistance when 
trial counsel did not challenge them. None of the claims were 
error; hence, trial counsel's failure to challenge them was not 
ineffective assistance. Trial counsel's performance was within 
the range of professional conduct and did not prejudice 
defendant. 
The jury instruction given by the court regarding 
valuation of the property taken was a correct recitation of the 
law. It was not error for the court to give that instruction. 
The jury correctly weighed the conflicting evidence of 
value given at trial and correctly determined the value of the 
property taken. 
The prosecutor's closing argument was a correct comment 
on the evidence and did not constitute misconduct. 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for 
new trial. Most of the issues raised on appeal as the basis for 
a new trial were not raised below, and, even if they had been, 
would not have justified a new trial. The one claim preserved 
below did not meet the standard for granting a new trial. The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion 
when the "newly discovered evidence", which defendant claimed, 
was material which could have been retrieved before trial. 
Besides, the material was merely cumulative. 
The evidence presented at trial supported a finding 
that defendant took the property with a purpose to permanently 
deprive the owner thereof. His testimony at trial, attempting to 
refute the State's evidence, was not credible. No reasonable 
minds would have entertained a reasonable doubt as to defendant's 
guilt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Defendant's first claim of error is that his trial 
counsel, Robert L. Froerer, provided ineffective assistance in 
violation of defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. He 
bases this allegation on a litany of supposed failures of 
counsel; these "failures" will be addressed individually in this 
point. 
The courts of this state have applied the standard of 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. In State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 
401 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court saids 
In claiming ineffective counsel, defendant 
has the burden to demonstrate that counsel's 
representation falls below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. Codianna v. 
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1108-09 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant must prove that specific, 
identified acts or omissions fall outside the 
wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. The claim may not be 
speculative, but must be a demonstrative 
reality, sufficient to overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised "reasonable 
professional judgment." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, . . . (1984); . . . 
And, an unfavorable result does not compel a 
conclusion of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. State v. Buel, 700 P.2d at 703. 
Furthermore, any deficiency must be 
prejudicial to defendant. It is not enough 
to claim that the alleged errors had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome or could 
have had a prejudicial effect on the fact 
finders. To be found sufficiently 
prejudicial, defendant must affirmatively 
show that a "reasonable probability" exists 
that, but for counsel's error, the result 
would have been different. We have defined 
"reasonable probability" as that sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the reliability of 
the verdict. 
However, these principles are not applied 
as a mechanical test, but are guides to the 
ultimate focus upon the fundamental fairness 
of the proceeding challenged. The purpose of 
the inquiry is simply to insure that 
defendant receives a fair trial. 
723 P.2d at 405 (footnote and additional citations omitted). 
This position was reiterated, and its interplay with 
pre-Strickland cases established, in State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 
909 (Utah 1988), in which the Utah Supreme Court said: 
In State v. McNicol, [554 P.2d 203 (Utah 
1976)] this Court held that an accused "is 
entitled to the assistance of a competent 
member of the Bar, who shows a willingness to 
identify himself with the interests of the 
accused and present such defenses as are 
available under the law and consistent with 
the ethics of the profession." [554 P.2d at 
204]. 
It is not enough to claim that the alleged 
ineffectiveness had some conceivable impact 
on the outcome of the trial. 
758 P.2d at 913 (footnotes omitted). In State v. McNicol, 554 
P.2d 203 (Utah 1976), cited in Lovell, the Supreme Court also 
said: 
A defendant bears the burden of 
establishing the inadequacy or 
ineffectiveness of counsel, and proof of such 
must be demonstrable reality and not a 
speculative matter. 
The record must establish that counsel 
was ignorant of the facts or the law, 
resulting in withdrawal of a crucial 
defense, reducing the trial to a "farce 
and a sham." 
. . . 
The instant case, the acts cited by 
defendant to sustain his allegation of 
incompetency, falls within the ambit of an 
attorney's legitimate exercise of judgment, 
as to trial tactics or strategy. 
554 P.2d at 204 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court has 
consistently said that it will "not second-guess 'an attorney's 
legitimate exercise of judgment, as to trial tactics or 
strategy.'" Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1110 (Utah 1983) 
(quoting State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d at 205). 
This Court has also followed the Strickland standard. 
See State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); 
State v. Harper, 761 P.2d 570, 571 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In 
Harper, this Court said: 
In analyzing a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, we must review the 
totality of circumstances and the complete 
context in which the possible attorney error 
occurred. State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 
273 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). A presumption 
exists on appeal that the trial was 
fundamentally fair to the defendant. State 
v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 406 (Utah 1986). 
761 P.2d at 571. The presumption alluded to by this Court 
mandates that M'[jJudicial scrutiny of defense counsel's 
performance must be highly deferential.'" State v. Buel, 700 
P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1985) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 689 (1984)). 
Another principle which addresses defendant's argument 
in the present case that his counsel's failure to object was 
ineffective assistance, is the principle that counsel is not 
required to raise a futile objection. This principle was 
recognized in State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982), 
abandoned on other grounds, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986): 
Effective representation does not require 
counsel to object when doing so would be 
futile. 
649 P.2d at 59. The principle was followed in State v. Iacono, 
725 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1986), when the Supreme Court stated: 
Because defendant had no ground to contest 
the constitutionality of the search and the 
resulting evidence, he was not denied the 
effective assistance of counsel by his 
attorney's failure to make a futile objection 
thereto. 
725 P.2d at 1378 (citations omitted). See also State v. Wight, 
765 P.2d 12, 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
It has long been established that decisions about 
whether to object at trial are matters of trial strategy and 
given deference by appellate courts. As the Utah Supreme Court 
said in State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), cert, denied, 
Wood v. Utah, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). 
Trial tactics lie within the prerogative 
of counsel and may not be dictated by his 
client. Decisions as to what witnesses to 
call, what objections to makef and, by and 
large, what defenses to interpose, are 
generally left to the professional judgment 
of counsel. 
648 P.2d at 91 (citations omitted). See also State v. Medina, 
738 P.2d 1021, 1023-24 (Utah 1987); State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 
203, 204 (Utah 1976); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 
(Utah 1983); State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1985); State 
v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1063-64 (Utah 1989). 
As to a claim that counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to object to a police officer's testimony, 
the Utah Supreme Court demonstrated the weighing process for 
determining prejudice in State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062 (Utah 
1988) . The Court said: 
[T]here was a legal basis for an objection to 
all of the comments defendant identifies. 
However, taking these comments as a whole, 
they do not necessarily constitute harmful 
error, and it is conceivable that counsel 
made a deliberate and wise tactical choice in 
not focusing jury attention on them by 
objecting. 
Although the comments made by [the 
officer] were problematic, they were brief 
and isolated. Furthermore, they were not so 
inflammatory as to change the outcome of the 
trial. The proper and admissible testimony 
in this trial . . . was extensive and was so 
much more serious than the objectionable 
testimony that it is hard to see how the 
improper testimony could have done much harm. 
Counsel's judgment in failing to object to 
inadmissible testimony may or may not have 
been poor. However, the testimony at trial 
established without much dispute all of the 
details of defendant's participation in the 
crime. 
766 P.2d at 1067. The Court affirmed the conviction because 
Colonna had not proven that his counsel's failure to object had 
prejudiced him. 
A claim of ineffective assistance for failure to object 
to the prosecution's closing argument involves first a 
determination "whether the prosecutor's remarks were improper." 
West Valley City v. Rislow# 736 P.2d 637, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). The test, as delineated in State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 
54, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973), is: 
[1] did the remarks call to the attention of 
the jurors matters which they would not be 
justified in considering in determining their 
verdict, and [2] were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, 
probably influenced by those remarks. 
513 P.2d at 426. However, "[c]ounsel for both sides have 
considerable latitude in their arguments to the jury; they have a 
right to discuss fully from their standpoints the evidence and 
the inferences and deductions arising therefrom." Jd. The 
courts will weigh the effect of any statements made by the 
prosecution with the evidence presented and, "if proof of a 
defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or remarks by 
the prosecutor will not be presumed prejudicial." Rislow, 736 
P.2d at 638. Defense counsel is not ineffective if he does not 
object because to do so might "only have emphasized the negative 
aspects of the case to the jury." Id. 
Turning now to the specific allegations raised by 
defendant, it is clear that his trial counsel presented an able 
defense. Defendant first claims that trial counsel's failure to 
object to the admission of the prosecution's exhibits was 
incompetence. The first exhibit, the agreement written by Ms. 
Cheever and signed by defendant (Addendum A), should have been 
objected to, defendant says, for lack of foundation and as 
hearsay. In making this argument, defendant points only to the 
testimony of Mr. Erickson that he did not draw up the agreement. 
However, the exhibit was not offered into evidence until after 
Ms. Cheever testified that she wrote the agreement and defendant 
signed it (Tr. at 55). Clearly, the document was admissible for 
whatever weight it had with the jury and, clearly, a proper 
foundation was laid for its admission. An objection for lack of 
foundation and hearsay based on Mr. Erickson's testimony alone 
would have been absurd. The foundation for admitting the 
document was laid by the testimony of Mr. Erickson and Ms. 
Cheever before the document was offered and the objection now 
urged would have been futile. 
An objection to the introduction of the State's second 
exhibit, the invoices (Addendum B), would also have been 
rejected. Defendant now urges that the invoices gave the wrong 
market value for the pallets and that the exhibit should have 
been objected to as misleading, irrelevant, immaterial, and 
prejudicial. The exhibit was identified by Mr. Erickson as 
copies of invoices showing the amount charged to and by Knox 
McDaniel for pallets (Tr. at 27). Defendant's suggested 
objection is that this was the wrong value to place on the 
pallets based on his witnesses' testimony. That is not an 
objection to the admissibility of the exhibit, but to the weight 
to be given to the exhibit. As will be addressed hereafter in 
the point on the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury was 
entitled to receive the evidence included on Exhibit No. 2 and to 
give that evidence the weight they felt it deserved. 
Next, defendant claimed that trial counsel was 
incompetent for not objecting to Detective Stubbs's testimony 
that defendant left a "bad trail" of information and that the 
detective told defendant that he was charged with a third degree 
felony. This argument is also without merit. Given the 
testimony that defendant had given both a telephone number and a 
license plate number that were one digit off, the detective could 
have correctly assumed that defendant had purposely changed the 
numbers to elude detection. Neither did the detective's 
statement that defendant was charged with a third degree felony 
prejudice defendant. The charge against defendant, including the 
degree, was read to the jury at the beginning of trial and they 
were told that the charge was not evidence that defendant had 
committed the crime (Tr. at 3-4). The officer's restatement of 
the degree of the crime charged was not evidence about the value 
of the pallets. There was nothing objectionable about the 
testimony, and, if there were, the testimony would have been 
harmless at best. As in the Colonna case cited above, the 
officer's statements were brief and not inflammatory, and, given 
the evidence against defendant, it is hard to see how the 
testimony could have done any harm. 
Defendant next complains that his trial counsel failed 
to object to the prosecutor's questions about defendant's marital 
status. First, the transcript shows that trial counsel did 
object and the court overruled the objection (Tr. at 71). 
Second, the questions asked by the prosecution were legitimate 
questions going to the credibility of defendant. Evidently, 
defendant had stated when he was released from jail that he was 
single (Tr. at 71-72). At trial, he testified that he was 
married and then, on cross-examination, testified that that 
marriage was common law (Tr. at 68 and 71). Defendant's view 
about his common law marriage was presented to the jury. 
Defendant's further allegation that trial counsel should have 
objected to the "admittance of the O.R. report" is equally 
meritless. The report was never offered or admitted into 
evidence; hence, counsel could not have objected to its 
admittance. 
Defendant also claims that it was ineffective 
assistance of counsel to fail to object to the State's 
questioning of the witness from APCO. The basis of that claim is 
unclear. The prosecution was entitled to question that witness 
about the basis of his valuation of pallets. 
The next claim, that the judge failed to allow 
defendant's witness to give his opinion of the value of the 
pallets, is without basis in fact. Mr. Puckett testified at 
length as to the amount paid for pallets (Tr. at 85-93). The 
question objected to was whether the witness was familiar with 
the market value of pallets (Tr. at 91). The jury could make its 
own determination about the witnesses' familiarity and the weight 
to give his testimony as to the value of the pallets. Further 
testimony about value on second redirect, when this question 
came, would have been merely cumulative. 
As to defendant's claim that trial counsel should have 
objected to the prosecutor's closing argument about the value of 
the pallets, the marital status of defendant, and telling a story 
about a mailman, there clearly was nothing objectionable about 
the argument. As quoted above, counsel has considerable latitude 
in arguments to the jury. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973). 
In State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975), the Supreme Court 
said: 
It is our opinion that it is not only the 
prerogative, but the duty of either counsel, 
to analyze all aspects of the evidence; and 
this should include any pertinent statements 
or deductions reasonably to be drawn 
therefrom as to what the evidence is or is 
not and what it does or does not show. 
Kazda, 540 P.2d at 951. The comments by the prosecution in 
closing argument in the present case fall within this statement 
from Kazda. Since the prosecution's closing argument was not 
objectionable, defendant could not have been prejudiced by trial 
counsel's not objecting to it. 
Defendant next claims that trial counsel failed to 
conduct a reasonable pretrial investigation of this case. His 
first allegation is that trial counsel did not know what digits 
in the numbers on Exhibit No. 1 were incorrect; obviously, then, 
he must have failed to investigate before trial. That allegation 
is not supported by the record. The transcript demonstrates that 
trial counsel knew which letter was incorrect in the license 
plate number and could not "remember offhand which number in the 
phone number is off" (Tr. at 39). That passage does not support 
a claim that trial counsel failed to conduct pretrial 
investigation. 
Defendant's additional claim that counsel did not 
investigate the value of the pallets is also not supported by the 
record. Trial counsel established defendant's theory of the 
value through the testimony of defendant and another nonparty 
witness. Failing to call additional witnesses as to value does 
not prove that counsel neglected to conduct pretrial 
investigation. Such evidence would have been merely cumulative, 
and its omission was not prejudicial to defendant. State v. 
Lacono, 725 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah 1986). 
The next claim also is meritless. Defendant complains 
that trial counsel neglected to obtain rulings from the court on 
his objections. The first, an objection to the detective's 
statement about a pallet company going out of business, was 
basically sustained. Although the court did not use the word 
"sustain", it did agree with defense counsel's objection and 
direct the prosecutor to proceed with another question (Tr. at 
43). The second objection was not to the testimony of the 
"expert witness" as defendant claims, but to trial counsel's 
"characterization of market value" (Tr. at 92). The 
prosecution's objection was based on the fact that the court had 
not yet instructed the jury on the definition of "market value." 
The witness had already testified as to the amount his company 
paid for and charged for pallets; it was for the jury to 
determine, based on the instructions, what the market value of 
the pallets was. The court sustained the objection, again 
without using the word "sustain" but with the same effect. Since 
defendant's witnesses were able to testify as to the amount paid 
for pallets, defendant was not prejudiced by the court's rulings. 
Defendant's argument that trial counsel was incompetent 
for failing to object to the jury instruction given on value is 
without merit as well (Tr. at 99). This would be error only if 
the instruction was erroneous. The instruction was not 
erroneous; an issue which will be addressed hereafter in a 
separate point. 
Defendant's final claim is that his trial counsel 
committed cumulative error which prejudiced defendant through 
ineffective assistance. Since defendant has not demonstrated 
that his individual claims of error have any validity, the theory 
of cumulative error does not apply. State v. Johnson, 115 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 6, 12 (Utah Aug. 17, 1989); State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 
498, 501-502 (Utah 1986). 
The minor details which defendant now complains of do 
not demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance fell 
"outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." 
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. Nor has defendant shown that he was 
prejudiced by the actions of his counsel. Taken in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdict, the evidence against 
defendant was overwhelming. See State v. Butterfield, 784 P.2d 
153, 154 (Utah 1989). He took the pallets, as was testified to 
by himself and by Mr. Erickson. He signed an agreement to return 
the pallets within one week, as was testified to by himself and 
Ms. Cheever. He did not return the pallets, as was testified to 
by himself, Mr. Erickson and Detective Stubbs. He gave a license 
plate number and a telephone number that were off by one digit to 
Ms. Cheever. He admitted to the detectives that he had taken the 
pallets and told them that he had sold them. His testimony that 
attempted to refute this evidence was self-serving and clearly 
not accepted by the jury. That testimony does not negate the 
weight of the evidence against defendant. 
The fact that there was contradictory 
testimony, without more, is not grounds for 
reversal, State v. Watts, Utah 675 P.2d 566, 
568 (1983). The conflicting evidence was 
before the jury, and it was the jury's 
responsibility to evaluate its significance. 
State v. Wulffenstein, Utah, 657 P.2d 289, 
292 (1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 . . . 
(1983). 
Buel, 700 P.2d at 703 (additional citations omitted). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT IN THIS MATTER PROPERLY 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY AS TO DETERMINING THE 
VALUE OF THE PROPERTY TAKEN. 
Defendant's next two points involve the determination 
of the value of the pallets in order to determine the degree of 
theft. In the second point in his brief, defendant argues that 
the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction for 
determining the value of the property. Defendant maintains that 
the trial court's instruction should not have involved market 
value but, instead, should have been based on replacement value. 
He bases this argument on the theory that because the pallets 
were not returned, they should have been considered destroyed. 
Then he argues that because the market value could not be 
ascertained, replacement value was the proper determination for 
the jury to have used. This is a misconstruction of the statute 
and case law regarding value. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101 (1978) defines "value" for 
purposes of the chapter in the criminal code regarding offenses 
against property, including theft offenses. Subsection (4) 
reads, in pertinent part: 
"Value" means: 
(a) The market value of the property, if 
totally destroyed, at the time and place 
of the offense, or where cost of 
replacement exceeds the market value; or 
(b) Where the market value cannot be 
ascertained, the cost of repairing or 
replacing the property within a reasonable 
time following the offense. 
The Utah Supreme Court first addressed this statute in State v. 
Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977). The court found that the 
provisions of § 76-6-101(4)(a) applied only to property that was 
totally destroyed. Because of the wording of the statute, "there 
is no existing statute as to the value of stolen property which 
is not ultimately destroyed. That being the case, we must look 
to the common law and to existing case law to determine the 
proper test of value applicable herein." 563 P.2d at 813. The 
court then stated that 
the common-law gradation of the offense of 
larceny that is based on the value of the 
property stolen has been retained in most 
jurisdictions, and in the absence of statutes 
providing otherwise, the measure of the value 
is its fair market value at the time and 
place where the alleged crime was committed. 
Market value has been further clarified as 
being a measure of what the owner could 
expect to receive, and the amount a willing 
buyer would pay to the true owner for the 
stolen item. . . . [T]he test is the market 
value of the property; that is, the price a 
well-informed buyer would pay to a well-
informed seller where neither is obliged to 
enter into the transaction. 
We accept the market-value test as the 
appropriate test to be used in determining 
the value of stolen property not otherwise 
provided for in our statute, and the trial 
court correctly stated the law in its jury 
instruction. 
563 P.2d at 813 (footnotes omitted). The highest court of this 
state has determined that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101(4)(a) is only 
applicable to property which is totally destroyed. It did not 
then determine, as defendant would have this Court do, that the 
inapplicability of subsection (a) requires the application of 
subsection (b) to theft cases not involving the destruction of 
the property. The court looked to the common law and concluded 
that the market value test is the appropriate test for 
determining the value in theft cases not covered by the valuation 
statute. The trial court in the present case properly used the 
market value test in deciding which instruction to give to the 
jury. See also State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515, 518-19 (Utah 
1980); State v. Gorlick, 605 P.2d 761, 761-62 (Utah 1979); State 
v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985). In State v. Slowe, 728 
P.2d 110 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court said: 
Fair market value is not the equivalent of 
"replacement cost or the price at which 
someone would sell under urgent necessity," 
State v. Gorlick, Utah 605 P.2d 761, 762 
(1979). 
729 P.2d 112. Defendant's contention that the trial court should 
have instructed the jury regarding replacement value instead of 
market value in the present case has been rejected by the courts 
of this state. 
Defendant's complaint about the jury instruction given 
in this case is not well-founded. The Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Logan, 563 P.2d at 812, and State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d at 
518, approved the following instruction: 
When the value of property alleged to have 
been taken by theft must be determined, the 
market value at the time and in the locality 
of the theft shall be the test. That value 
is the highest price, estimated in terms of 
money, for which the property would have sold 
in the open market at the time and in that 
locality, if the owner was desirous of 
selling, but under no urgent necessity of 
doing so, and if the buyer was desirous of 
buying but under no urgent necessity of so 
doing, and if the seller had a reasonable 
time within which to find a purchaser, and 
the buyer had knowledge of the character of 
the property and of the use to which it might 
be put. 
In the present case, the court gave the following instruction: 
When the value of property alleged to have 
been taken by the theft must be determined, 
the reasonable and fair market value at the 
time and in the locality of the theft shall 
be the test. Fair market value is the 
highest price, in cash, for which the 
property would have sold in the open market 
at that time and in that locality, 
(1) If the owner was desirous of selling, 
but under not urgent necessity of doing so; 
(2) If the buyer was desirous of buying but 
under no urgent necessity of doing so; (3) If 
the seller had a reasonable time within which 
to find a purchaser; and (4) If the buyer had 
knowledge of the character of the property 
and of the uses to which it might be put. 
(Tr. at 104-105) (emphasis added). The instruction given in the 
present case differed from the judicially accepted instruction 
only in the words underlined. Those differences are minor and do 
not invalidate the instruction. 
POINT III 
THE JURY CORRECTLY APPLIED THE INSTRUCTIONS 
TO THE EVIDENCE AND ARRIVED AT A CORRECT 
DECISION AS TO THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY 
TAKEN. 
Defendant next maintains that the jury applied the 
wrong market value to the pallets in finding defendant guilty of 
felony theft. This is also a sufficiency of the evidence 
argument. 
Fair market value in theft cases such as the instant 
one is "the price a well-informed buyer would pay to a well-
informed seller where neither is obliged to enter into the 
transaction." Logan, 563 P.2d at 813. The value is measured "at 
the time and place where the alleged crime was committed." Id. 
An owner may testify as to the value of the property taken. In 
State v. Limb# 581 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court 
said: 
In State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 439, 519 
P.2d 247 (1974), this Court concluded that an 
owner is competent to testify and that the 
trier of fact can take its own view to the 
value of the property in question. This 
Court stated: 
Value is something at which the jury 
may take a look. The owner of an article 
is competent to testify as to its value, 
and such testimony is admissible, but 
neither inviolate nor impervious to 
disbelief. The jury may take a view of 
the item for excellence or shodiness 
[sic], and look through the same 
spectacles at the witness to determine the 
latter's imagination or credibility,—and 
the verdict is its as to value. 519 P.2d 
at 248. 
Limb, 581 P.2d at 145. This is a restatement of the jury's 
obligation to determine the credibility of witnesses and to 
determine the facts of the case. A jury's determination should 
be accorded deference and "the 'Court should only interfere when 
. . . reasonable men could not possibly have reached a verdict 
beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 
412 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 
231 (Utah 1980)). 
The case of State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985), 
dealt with a determination of what evidence a jury could use to 
decide the issue of value. It is clear that: 
a jury [cannot] disregard expert testimony as 
to the fair market value of stolen property 
and fix a higher value when there is no basis 
in the evidence properly before the court to 
justify that value. Of course, a jury is 
free to disregard expert testimony in whole 
or in part, . . . and it may also discount 
the value of property estimated by an expert. 
707 P.2d at 662-63 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In that 
case, camera equipment, which had been purchased in Price, Utah, 
was stolen from a vehicle in downtown Salt Lake City. The 
prosecution introduced evidence that the value of the camera in 
Price was $490.00; the defense introduced evidence that the value 
was only $177.00 in Salt Lake City. The Supreme Court reiterated 
that the value was to be determined at the time and place where 
the crime was committed. Since Price is a rural community much 
smaller that Salt Lake and over one hundred miles away, the 
testimony of value in Price was irrelevant to the value at the 
place of the crime. Throwing out the Price valuation left only 
the valuation given by Carter's witness; that value was less than 
$250.00, so the conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor. 707 
P.2d at 662-63. 
The same reasoning was used in State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 
110 (Utah 1985), resulting in a different decision. Slowe's 
witness had testified that the purportedly stolen ring was valued 
at less than $1000.00, while the prosecution's witness had 
testified that the value was over that amount. Slowe argued that 
the state's witness had testified to replacement or estate value, 
which left his witness's testimony as the only relevant evidence 
of value. The court stated: 
On his [defendant's] expert's testimony alone 
there would be no rational basis for the 
jury's choosing the higher rather than the 
lower figure. However, the defendant does 
not accurately characterize the State's 
expert witness' testimony. The State's 
expert witness' appraisal was in actuality an 
appraisal of the fair market value of the 
ring. 
728 P.2d at 112. Since the prosecution's evidence of value was 
relevant, even though it differed from the defendant's evidence, 
the jury was justified in accepting the evidence from the 
prosecution and convicting Slowe based on it. ^d. See also 
State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1985) ("contradictory 
testimony, without more, is not grounds for reversal. . . . The 
conflicting evidence was before the jury, and it was the jury's 
responsibility to evaluate its significance"). 
In the present case there was conflicting evidence 
regarding the value of the pallets taken. Mr. Erickson testified 
that the cost charged to and by Knox McDaniel for the pallets was 
$8.00 each (Tr. at 29 and Exhibit No. 2, Addendum B). This was 
the cost at the place from which the pallets were taken in Ogden. 
On the other hand, defendant testified that the pallets he got 
from Knox McDaniel were only worth $2.50 each (Tr. at 66). He 
testified that the most select pallets would only bring $4.50 at 
most (Tr. at 66). Defendant also called Mr. Puckett from APCO 
Pallet Company, who testified that the best pallets sold for 
M[a]bout $5.50" in Salt Lake City. Pallets of lesser value would 
sell for less (Tr. at 85-86 and Exhibit No. 3, Addendum C). Mr. 
Puckett testified that the cost would vary depending on who was 
buying and how many they bought (Tr. at 88). 
As in most cases, the jury had before it conflicting 
evidence regarding the value of the property taken. Their 
responsibility was to evaluate the contradictory testimony and 
arrive at a determination of value. State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 
702 (Utah 1985). They had the prosecution's evidence that Knox 
McDaniel paid $8.00 apiece for the pallets delivered in Ogden as 
part of its business. They also had the prosecution's evidence 
that customers of Knox McDaniel paid $8.00 each for the pallets 
when the product left the company on the pallets. Those 
customers received a credit for the same amount when they 
returned the pallets in good condition. If the pallets were not 
returned, the customers paid the $8.00. 
On the other hand, the jury heard from defendant that 
he bought and sold pallets for $2.00 to $4.50 from Provo to 
Ogden. They also heard that in Salt Lake City the APCO Company 
sells pallets alone for $3.95 to $5.50, and bought pallets for 
50£ to $3.00. The difference in the place and particulars of 
purchase between the two sets of evidence justified the jury's 
decision to value the pallets at what Knox McDaniel paid for them 
at Ogden. The relevant testimony was the evidence from Mr. 
Erickson. The contradictory testimony from defendant and Mr. 
Puckett was properly weighed by the jury, and the jury 
accomplished its function of determining which testimony to 
credit. 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN 
CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
Defendant next claims that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct in closing argument which prejudiced defendant. 
Specifically, defendant argues that the prosecutor erroneously 
argued the $8.00 market value of the pallets; that the 
prosecutor's story about a mailman was prejudicial and 
misleading; and that the prosecutor argued prejudicially about 
defendant's marital status. 
The Utah Supreme Court has delineated a test for 
determining whether remarks by counsel constitute misconduct 
which requires reversal. As stated above, in State v. Valdez, 30 
Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973), the court said: 
The test of whether the remarks made by 
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a 
reversal in a criminal case is, [1] did the 
remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict, and 
[2] were they, under the circumstances of the 
particular case, probably influenced by those 
remarks. 
Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426. The court, in State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 
483 (Utah 1984), further explained the second step of the Valdez 
approach. The Court directed that this step "involves a 
consideration of the case as a whole." Troy, 688 P.2d at 486. 
Specifically, the Court said that 
if proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the 
challenged conduct or remark will not be 
presumed prejudicial. State v. Seeger, 4 
Or.App. 336, 479 P.2d 240 (1971). Likewise, 
in a case with less compelling proof, this 
Court will more closely scrutinize the 
conduct. 
Troy, 688 P.2d at 486. 
The appellate courts of this state have long recognized 
that "[c]ounsel for both sides have considerable latitude in 
their arguments to the jury; they have a right to discuss fully 
from their standpoints the evidence and the inferences and 
deductions arising therefrom." State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426. 
See also State v. Lafferty# 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988); 
State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975). However, the courts 
have also defined certain limits to this latitude. The Utah 
Supreme Court indicated those limits in State v. Valdez, as 
quoted above. In State v. Kazda, the Supreme Court said: 
It is our opinion that it is not only the 
prerogative, but the duty of either counsel, 
to analyze all aspects of the evidence; and 
this should include any pertinent statements 
or deductions reasonably to be drawn 
therefrom as to what the evidence is or is 
not and what it does or does not show. 
540 P.2d at 951. The comments by the prosecution in closing 
argument in the present case fall within this statement from 
Kazda. 
The prosecutor in the present case followed the case 
law as set out above. He properly argued the evidence of value 
which had been presented by Mr. Erickson, defendant, and Mr. 
Puckett (Tr. at 113-14). His story about the mailman was given 
in the context of determining whether to believe defendant. As 
such, it did not improperly call to the attention of the jury 
matters which they were not entitled to consider. The story was 
well within the latitude afforded by the courts of this state in 
closing argument. 
The prosecution's argument regarding defendant's 
marital status was given in the context of the credibility of 
defendant. The prosecutor correctly pointed out the different 
stories defendant had told at different times regarding taking 
the pallets (Tr. at 117-28). The prosecution then directed the 
jury's attention to defendant's differing statements at different 
times about his marital status (Tr. at 118-19). This was proper 
argument on the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences 
from that evidence. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in not 
granting his motion for new trial. He claims on appeal that the 
errors supporting a new trial were 1) the use of $8.00 as the 
market value; 2) the judge's failure to rule on objections; 3) an 
erroneous jury instruction regarding value; and 4) newly 
discovered evidence of the market value of the pallets. The only 
one of these supposed errors that defendant brought to the 
attention of the trial court in his motion for new trial was the 
claim of newly discovered evidence (R. at 73-74). The other 
claims should be deemed waived for failure to preserve them 
below. State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah). See also 
State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986). 
Even if this Court were to address the claims not 
preserved, the claims do not support an order for new trial. All 
of the issues except the one of newly discovered evidence have 
been addressed above in this brief and shown not to be error. 
Since they were not error, it was not error to deny a new trial 
based on those claims. 
The one issue preserved below was a claim of newly 
discovered evidence. For the newly discovered evidence, 
defendant submitted additional quotes regarding the value of 
pallets (R. at 70). The Utah Supreme Court has said: 
[T]he decision to grant or deny a new trial 
is a matter of discretion with the trial 
court and will not be reversed absent a clear 
abuse of that discretion. . . . "New 
evidence" is not evidence which was available 
to defendant but not obtained by him prior to 
the time of trial. . . . Nor is it evidence 
that he knew about or could have discovered 
prior to trial. 
State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985) (citations 
omitted). The price quotations presented by defendant as "newly 
discovered evidence" are clearly material which he either did 
know or could have known before trial and are not newly 
discovered evidence. In addition, the quotations are merely 
cumulative to the evidence which defendant did present at trial. 
See State v. Hughes, 13 Ariz.App. 391, 477 P.2d 265, 266 (1970). 
Defendant was not entitled to a new trial, and the trial court's 
denial of the motion for new trial was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
POINT VI 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S FINDING OF 
GUILT IN THIS MATTER. 
Defendant claims that the evidence presented at trial 
was insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, he 
maintains that the evidence did not demonstrate that he had a 
purpose to deprive Knox McDaniel of the pallets. 
The appellate courts of this state have repeatedly 
articulated the standard of review on appeal when the argument 
concerns sufficiency of the evidence. The appellate courts 
accord great deference to the jury verdict. It is the exclusive 
function of the jury to weigh the evidence and determine the 
credibility of the witnesses. "[T]he 'Court should only 
interfere when . . . reasonable men could not possibly have 
reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. 
Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting State 
v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980)). Furthermore, defendant 
has the burden of establishing "that the evidence was so 
inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime." State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980). See 
also State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989). The courts 
have succinctly stated that, unless there is a clear showing of a 
lack of evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld. See Gabaldon, 
735 P.2d at 412. 
On the issue of proving a culpable mental state, the 
Utah Supreme Court has said: 
[A culpable mental state] need not be 
proved by direct evidence, and, of course, is 
always subject to denial by an accused. The 
fact-finder, however, is entitled to draw all 
reasonable inferences from the facts and from 
the actions of the defendant. As this Court 
stated in State v. Peterson, 22 Utah 2d 377, 
453 P.2d 696 (1969); 
With respect to the intent: It is true 
that the State was unable to prove 
directly what was in the defendant's mind 
relative to doing harm to the victim; and 
that he in fact denied any such intent. 
However, his version does not establish 
the fact nor does it even necessarily 
raise sufficient doubt to vitiate the 
conviction. If it were so, it would lie 
within the power of a defendant to defeat 
practically any conviction which depended 
upon his state of mind. [453 P.2d at 
697.] 
State v. Cooley, 603 P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 1979). The requisite 
mental state may be inferred from the actions of the defendant or 
from the surrounding circumstances. State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 
1220, 1223 (Utah 1983) . 
In his brief, defendant claims that he showed his 
license to the secretary, which demonstrates that he must not 
have had a purpose to deprive. He does not cite to the record 
for this "fact", and the record does not support such a 
statement. 
Defendant testified that he just forgot to return the 
pallets. This statement does not refute the overwhelming 
evidence against defendant, evidence which fully supports the 
jury's verdict. Taken in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, the evidence shows that defendant picked up the pallets 
at Knox McDaniel and then gave the secretary a license plate 
number and a telephone number, both of which contained one digit 
which was different from the correct ones. He did not return the 
pallets in the time specified. When the police were able to 
trace defendant, he told them that he had just forgotten to 
return the pallets. Then he told them that he had taken the 
pallets directly to APCO and sold them. At trial, he returned to 
his story of having just forgotten to return the pallets. He 
claimed that he had not been told when to return them. He said 
•3 C 
that he had lied to the officers about selling the pallets in 
order to get them to tell him what the case was about. 
The jury's decision to discredit the testimony of 
defendant, who, at the very least, admitted to lying to the 
officers, cannot be faulted. The evidence is ample to show that 
reasonable minds would not have entertained a reasonable doubt of 
defendant's guilt. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _^_j^_ day of March, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
( j i ! ^ i I 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
801-399-3775 
DR.JOHNKUHL fit*-*,/ 1987 SWINE SEMINAR 
I - I O - ^ 
^(JVJXDU^^ ^flJUfrto- & 3 0 . O 0 
tftA I M > » * N V ^ - L > 4 3 ( , V)P 
STATE'S EXHIBIT 
1 Exhibit No. 
Case No. 
Date m 25 S39 
<5%c^ 
ADDENDUM B 
MtUA IWCilMlLL LUmriifll 
815 WEST 24th STREET 
P.O. BOX 1184 OGDEN, UTAH 84402 
PHONE (801) 399-3775 
A FINANCE CHARGE OF 2% PER MONTH (24% ANNUAL) 
WILL BE ADDED TO ALL PAST DUE AMOUNTS. PUR-
CHASER AGREES TO PAY ALL COSTS OF COLLECTION, 
INCLUDING A REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEE. 
INVOICE NO.: 
CUSTOMER CODE: 
• • V W 
3053 
JO ICC 
SOLD 
TO: 
ED JONES DAIRY 
4917 WEST 4000 SOUTH 
HOOPER, UT 84315 
SHIP 
TO: 
ED JONES DAIRY 
4917 WEST 40CC SOUTH 
HOOPER, UT 84315 
INV.DATE 03-29-89
 SHJPVIA CUSTOMER 
i ' £' i * P v 03-27-89 
. ; ; . _ - ;
 m :j= NOT BEFORE ^ ° c / °^  
.0. NUMBER 
FOB. O r i g i n 
03-29-89 
PROMISED DATE 
NET 30 DAYS'-
©087. \ 
TERMS . t _ . . 
% - . -
. ^ 
(QUANTITY/ 
1988 
£000 
2 
ITEM NUMBER/DESCRIPTION ^ ^ ; ^ ^ 1 { ; 1 < X V . | ; UNIT PRICE ' I DISCOUNT I EXTENDED PRICE 
KNXO1000 
ED JONES DAIRY CONC. lft 
GSLC3114 
MIXING SALT ltt 
MISC3860 
PALLETS * 
To ta l 
*If pallets are returned In good 
your acoount. 
condition 
STATE'S EXHIBIT 
Exhibit No. 
CO,. NO. g f / 9 / f t T f ? 
MAY 2fi fiffi " \ 
0. 22 
0 .0516 
8 . 0 0 
a cr4dit will be issued to 
437. 36 
103 .20 
16 .00 
*556.56 
KM MtDA«itiL mm i 
R.fUVfEST 'M'h GTHETi 
P.O. B O X i;a-; nnnrr.. • i:. 
DHON(- (POM .W ?V7:, 
^ v ^ « v-/ 
1 0 1 3 
:n» p r.oi »• 
90! 0 
OWYHEE" VETEETNH!>Y I ?! I! i 
ROUTE : BOX lt^ -'j 
H O M E D A L E , 1 V> !}.3hc-:i:-. 
OWYHEE VETERINARY EL 1 NIC 
ROUTE 1 BOX lfl£5 
M E M E D M L E , ID >33G,::^ . 
0 3 - Q l -QfJ 
-TftS 
INV. DATE 
P.O. NUMBER 
S H I P VIA 
ee-e i -89 
NOT nL'rQRti 
-DRM SI-GN 
OvM g iv, 
tft3~tfl~-Et9— 
NEX~3BrBRY5" 
12150 KNXO 136*9 
OWYHEE CAL-IDA 9'/ 141 
MISC3860 
PALLETS 
Total 
I X HdtOIEL COMFIT 
815 WEST 24th S T ' ^ F T 
P.O. BOX 1184 OGDEN. UTA' 
PHONF (son 3Pr--:v7n 
• > ;-v; : ; i .-><;% A N N U A L ) 
•
r iVO?n. W . 
CUSTOMER CODE: 
I ^ V U I V / t 
J. tf. >:::.. 
RK / tf 0 
SOLD 
TO: 
REOMGNO PLAY & Mftl. T C O M P M N Y 
P . O . BOX £ 1 9 
REDMOND, UT 8 4 6 5 2 SHIP 
TO: 
REDMOND CLAY ?, SALT COMPAQ 
P . O . BOX £ 1 9 
REDMOND, UT 8 4 6 5 2 
i i - i e - a e CUSTOMER 
MY. D A T E • - . " • • ' • ; :. S H I P V I A 
O r i g i n NET 30 DAYS 
F.O.B. 
i i -17-ee n-ie-aa -3«^9: 
.0. NUMBER ! V 5 * / ^ 
NOT BEFORE PROMISED DATE TERMS ^-
:
^r-:^-
QUANTITY^ 
4000 
2 
ITEM NUMBER/DESCRIPTION UNIT PRICE I DISCOUNT I j EXTENDED PRICE 
N0P03987 
XP-4 1# 
MISC3860 
PALLETS 
Total 
0. 36E 
6.00 
1,448.00 
18.00 
• 1,464.00 
INVOICE 
MIN-AD, INC. 
1630 25th Avenue 
GREELEY, COLORADO 80631 
303-352-5232 
INVOICE NO. 
INVOICE DATI 
??*~A\ * •# '^*- w • ^ 
"^ -f 
p ^ ^ 8 9 •••:•! Jg#^ 
DATE SHIPPED. 2-6 -89 
SHIPPED TO: 
Afoijo^l .so.3 
SAME 
SOLD TO: 
Knox-McDaniel Co. 
815 W. 24 th S t . 
Ogden, UT 84402 
fc)rder No. 
181 
|ANTITY> 
LOO 8 
18 
.Your Order No. 
3584 
Sales Representative 
A. Bader 
Terms 
Net 30 days 
Shipped Via 
R i t e - W a y 
4w^?«^=«Sf^^''-V..- .:•*>'•• DESCRIPTION 
50# bags MIN-AD ,£Standard Grade = 2 5 . 2 Tons *''% , 
48" X 40" X 4-way p a l l e t s t o be s o l d a t 
TOTAL 
* :;--'J / •••••,>--/' i-v v5 
PRICE 
- $ 6 0 / t o n 
$8 each 
Ppd. or CoU. 
XX 
AMOUNT 
$ 1 , 5 1 2 . 0 0 
1 4 4 . 0 0 
$ 1 , 6 5 6 . 0 0 
<JK^ 
stdue charge of 1Va% per month, 16% per year will be added to accounts over 30 days. 
IIES: WHITE - Customer, YELLOW - Min-Ad, GREEN - Min-Ad, GOLDENROD - Sales Representative 
PLEASE SEND 
Form S2-84236-500 
.COPIES OF YOUR INVO! 
REDFORM 
2 H 2 5 9 
BE SURE TO MAKE THIS 
RECORD ACCURATE AND COMPLETE 
••mim-
_PURCHASE ORDE 
ZS Color &• /upplg Co., Inc. 
2011 South A)l*»s Street • Milwaukee, Wl 53207 
Phone: (414)481-6170 
PLEASE REMIT TO 
DCS COLOR & SUPPLY CO INC. 
MB UNIT NO 6035 
MILWAUKEE, Wl 53268 
)3&-
INVOICE NO 
CUSTOMER P.O. NO: 
SHIP VIA 
DATE SHIPPED 
OUR REFERENCE NO 
3598 
Roadrunner 
02/20/89 
132 
i h///4 
si 
o? 
Kno:' McDaniel Company 
P. 0- BOJJ 1184 
Ogd^n, UT 84402 
Kno;: McDaniel Company 
815 West 15th Street 
Ogden, UT B4402 
CUS-TOMER ID 
KNOX 
\N71TY 
5ERED 
SALESPERSON 
0 8 Dm C r a w f o r d 
QUANTITY 
SHIPPED 
BILLING 
UNIT 
SALES TAX COPE 
Wl 
TERMS 
NET 3 0 DAYS 
DESCRIPTION 
5.75 
5.50 
.50 
2.00 
15.75 
5.50 
.50 
2.00 
PER CWT 
PER CWT 
PER CWT 
EACH 
63-25# 
10-55# 
1-50*1 
Wooden 
Low Bags #67 tfe 
Bags # 1 2 J B £ M « L 
Bag # 6 2 0 B l a c k > 
P a l l e t s 
PRICE 
5 5 . 0 0 
1 9 5 . 0 0 
9 9 . 7 5 
8 . 5 0 
cr FAX ITcr'DCS "(414)481-3632 
AMOUNT, 
8 6 6 . 2 J 
1 , 0 7 2 . 5 -
4 9 . Bt 
0( 
M ?' 
'JEASE RETURN REMITTANCE COPY WITH PAYMENT PLEASE PAY LAST i \ 
NET AMOUNT 
FREIGHT 
SALES TAX 
INVOICE 
THTA! 
? r O ^ - A l 
-2T00'57fi^ 
ftfcMJT TO : 
? KNOX MCDANIEL COMPANY 
t 815 WEST 24TH STREET 
OCDEN UT 
BOX 4223 
^ASADENA, CA. 91050 
PLAN 
8 4 4 0 2 
13 PLEASE REFERENCE THIS NUMBER ON ALL PAYMENTS AND CORRESPONDENCE ' SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH PAGE 
g KNOX MCDANIEL COMPANY 
P 815 WEST 24TH STREET 
X P. O. BO BOX 1184 
3iJ5S0S3?4 
OGDEN UT 84402 
& DATE SHIPPED 
0 3 8 9 
SHIPPED VIA 
SILVERWING 
FREIGHT 
F F A 
F.O.B. 
MILL 
BILL OF LADING NO. 
SC18053 
CUSTOMER P.O. HO.J^?S£fe£ 
3 7 1 9 
SALESMAN 
H 4 8 
QUANTITY 
2 2 , 2 2 5 . O 
1 3 . 0 
UNIT 
BG 
•C = COMPLETES ORDER 
DESCRIPTION 
OlO-0O19~0O?30~O0 
12 X 4 X 2 9 
PLAIN WITH FCS & IMPRINT 
SVTI 
<G~N-R INST.ON 
TAPE IN 7121 RED) 
A-9999-0000-
GROSS WT. 10670.0 
PALLETS 
FREIGHT CHARGE 
FREIGHT ALLOWANCE 
NET WT. 9426.S 
NET WT. 
GROSS WT. 
TERMS: FFA 
P = PARTIAL 
9426.5 
10670.0 
- FULL FREIGHT ALLOWED 
ORDER-ITEM 
B C 0 5 2 3 0 - A C 
.r;:;$pmcEi...::'... 
3 0 9 . 4 5 0 
8 . 0 0 0 
. 9 8 0 
. 9 8 0 
MAR29198& 
2 7 9 9 6 4 
M 3 5 9 9 7 0 2 
UNIT, 
MBG 
EA 
CW 
CW 
2 7 9 9 6 4 s 
M 3 5 9 9 7 < 
AMOUNT. 
6 T 0 7 7 T S 2 " 
1 0 4 . 0 0 
1 0 4 . 5 7 
1 0 4 . 5 7 C 
>\L 
"STONE CONTAINER CORPORATION. THE MANUFACTURERS OF THE GOOOS 
DESCRIBED IN THIS INVOICE. HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THESE GOODS WERE 
PROOUCEO IN COMPLIANCE WITH ALL APPLICABLE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS 
6. 7. ANO 12 OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT. AS AMENDED. AND OF 
REGULATIONS AND ORDERS OF THE UNITFD STATES DEPARTMENT OF LAOOR 
TERMS 
i.% 1 0 NET 30 
.; IFPAIOBY 
O 4 / 0 6 / 8 9 
CASH DISCOUNT J.& 
6 7 . 7 3 TOTAL 
TfcV98t".*^ 
ADDENDUM C 
No. 
U 
PCO 
Pallets 537 Nerth 300 North 
To 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
(801)534-1118 
^ //^^J^^Y/ 
DATE / / ^9 
, INQUIRY DAtE / l 
«• *f — — _ _ 
ESTIMATED DELIVERY 
T 
TERMS 
•—— 
F.O.B. 
TO BE SHIPPED VIA 
SALESMAN 
INQUIRY NO. 
FROM 
RECEIPT 
OF ORDER 
FOLLOW UP DATE 
In response to your inquiry, we submit the following Quotation. 
QUANTITY STOCK NUMBER / DESCRIPTION PRICE PER AMOUNT 
-0 
-iSK-P im-'my^^^ -i te 
TOTAL k£z 
OTHER INFORMATION 
b£F EXHIBIT 
Exhibit No. 3 
Case No. 
Date fW 25 1989 
D/oaco rofor to the ahove Quotation Number when Diacina vour order. 
